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Abstract: 
 
The success story of Korean economic development is intimately linked with the so-called 
developmental state; and education policy, as part of centrally orchestrated industrial policy, 
played a critical role in the country’s rapid industrialisation, which allowed for high employ-
ment rates, relatively modest social inequality and remarkable social mobility. However, the 
Korean success story has started to show ‘cracks’ – with labour market dualisation, rising 
inequality and ‘over-education’. Whilst acknowledging the importance of the East Asian fi-
nancial crisis as external shock for the Korean political economy, we suggest more funda-
mental problems in the socio-economic and socio-political underpinnings of the develop-
mental state and its education and skills formation system for understanding how Korea’s 
economic and education miracle turned into ‘education inflation’, skills mismatch and social 
polarisation.  
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The development of the Korean society and economy is astonishing. From colonial suppres-
sion and the devastation of the Korean War (1950-53), the country developed into an ad-
vanced economy and high-income country within the matter of a few decades, with one of 
the fastest growing economies in the developing world. In 1996, Korea entered the ‘club of 
rich nations’, the OECD. Also, considering the absence of a developed system of social pro-
tection, it is remarkable that the country presented a relatively egalitarian society. Not only 
Korea  managed to ‘lift itself from poverty’ (Ringen et al. 2011) but also to reduce social ine-
quality and to promote social mobility (Cheon 2014; Park 2010).  
The success story of Korean economic development is intimately linked with the so-
called developmental state at the heart of rapid industrialisation in the 1970s and 1980s. 
The authoritarian state subordinated all aspect of policy to its economic modernisation pro-
ject. Education policy, as part of centrally orchestrated industrial policy, played a key role in 
the rapid economic development of the country. In fact, the Korean ‘economic miracle’ is 
closely associated with an ‘education miracle’. The critical importance of Korea’s “sound ed-
ucational infrastructure” (Jeong 1995: 7) is widely highlighted when appraising the extraor-
dinary rapid industrialisation the country experienced; and Cheon suggests a “virtuous cycle 
(…) in which education and growth reinforced each other” (2014: 219; see also Ashton et al. 
2002 and Park 2012 on the developmental education and skills formation regime). 
However, the Korean success story has started to display ‘cracks’. Admittedly, the 
slowing down of growth rates is something one might expect with the maturation of the 
economy. But we also observe a significant increase in social inequality, unemployment (es-
pecially, youth unemployment) and labour market dualisation with a massive increase in 
irregular employment. The struggle of young people to enter the labour market might be 
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considered particularly puzzling in light of substantial education expenditure and the ex-
traordinary educational attainment of young Koreans. However, closer inspection shows 
considerable skills mismatch in the Korean labour market caused by ‘over-education’ (Park 
2011; OECD 2009a); and, despite a well-educated workforce, Korea presents very poor la-
bour productivity by international standards (OECD 2015). 
These observations suggest that the ‘virtuous cycle’ that has been associated with 
developmental skills formation is no longer in place. The decline of the developmental state 
is typically discussed in the context of the East Asian financial crisis of 1997 (Lee and Han 
2006; Lim and Jang 2006), and indeed labour market deregulation in the aftermath of the 
crisis is key to understanding the rise of irregular employment and social inequality (Peng 
2012; Song 2014). However, whilst acknowledging the importance of the East Asian financial 
crisis as exogenous shock for the Korean political economy that could be read in terms of 
breaking a ‘punctuated equilibrium’ and creating a ‘critical juncture’ (Collier and Collier 1991; 
Krasner 1988; see also on institutional stability and change in comparative political economy: 
Deeg and Jackson 2007; Mahoney and Thelen 2010), we suggest more fundamental prob-
lems in the socio-economic and socio-political underpinnings of the developmental state 
and its education and skills formation system for understanding how Korea’s economic and 
education miracle turned into ‘education inflation’, skills mismatch and social polarisation. 
Before the East Asian financial crisis, the developmental state and its education and 
skills formation regime appeared as a stable equilibrium allowing rapid economic moderni-
sation; and the above mentioned ‘virtuous cycle’ suggests institutional complementarities 
underpinning self-reinforcement and stability (i.e. path dependence). According to the 
prominent Varieties of Capitalism approach, “two institutions can be said to be complemen-
tary if the presence (or efficiency) of one increases the returns from (or efficiency of) the 
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other” (Hall and Soskice 2001: 17; see also Crouch 2010; Deeg 2007). Yet, there were con-
siderable conflicts beneath the surface, which has received insufficient attention in the de-
velopmental state and, more generally, the East Asian political economy literature. These 
long-standing conflicts are critical to the transformation of Korea’s previously highly coordi-
nated market economy (CME) after democratic transition in the late 1980s. Paradoxically, 
the success of the Korean developmental strategy, we argue, undermined the very founda-
tions of the developmental state. As intended, the ‘economic miracle’ produced large, fami-
ly-controlled business conglomerates (so-called chaebols), whose rising economic and politi-
cal power undermined the state’s steering capacity, and this process was accelerated by 
democratisation and economic liberalisation of the 1990s.  
Democratisation also undermined the state’s capacity to supress the population’s 
deeply engrained desire for academic education (as a means of social mobility), which was, 
in the aftermath of the East Asian financial crisis, further driven by labour market dualisa-
tion, associated job insecurity and rising social inequality in the face of considerable gaps in 
social protection. Whilst huge private investments in education facilitated the ‘education 
miracle’, it ultimately produced an incredibly inefficient allocation of resources, over-
education and skills mismatch. In other words, the ‘virtue’ of mobilising significant resources 
for education turned into ‘pathological’ strategies to secure chaebol employment, which has 
become ever less likely because of chaebols’ ever shrinking internal labour markets. By con-
trast, small- and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) suffer from a lack of skilled workers. Ko-
rea is, as a result, characterised by skills polarisation and a low skills/low productivity trap as 
far as large parts of the economy are concerned. 
Instead of relegating the transformation of Korea’s education and skills formation 
regime to the exogenous shock that is associated with the East Asian financial crisis, we 
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highlight endogenous sources of institutional change that are not compatible with the equi-
librium-functionalist approach of Varieties of Capitalism and institutional complementarities. 
We argue that the developmental state and its education and skills formation regime have 
always been a very fragile equilibrium that rested upon an all-powerful state (an authoritar-
ian regime in fact) rather than genuine self-reinforcement that is associated with institu-
tional complementarities. Contestation, though suppressed, persisted during the authoritar-
ian episode, and democratisation in the late 1980s finally allowed voice and outright ‘defec-
tion’ of not only employers but also parents.  
In an endogenous model of institutional change, the focus of analysis is on “how so-
cial and political interaction transforms institutions” (Capoccia 2016: 1096). Here, the issue 
of power and, especially, the imbalance of power is critical. As Amable (2000) underlines, 
institutions and complementarities are the result of social and political struggles, and ‘losers’ 
do not simply disappear. Not only the East Asian political economy literature but also, more 
generally, the institutionalist literature have been downplaying power and conflict in epi-
sodes of institutional reproduction (cf. Peters, Pierre, and King 2005; Mahoney and Thelen 
2010). For this reason, a historical-political approach to institutional change is much better 
equipped to help us understand the political economy of education and skills in Korea and 
the country’s departure from the developmental education and skills formation regime. By 
highlighting how the change of power dynamics between the state, business and parents 
drove the breakdown of the fragile equilibrium that led to Korea’s departure from the re-
gime, the paper seeks to overcome the equilibrium-functionalist bias in the literatures and 
to contribute to identifying endogenous sources of institutional changes. Korea’s education 
and skills formation system and its transformation is discussed against the experiences of 
Germany and Britain. The former is widely considered the archetype of a CME with an ap-
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prenticeship model combining workplace training with vocational training schools (so-called 
‘dual system’) to produce (industry) specific skills, whereas general skills formation through 
universities features less prominently. By contrast, Britain – the European prime example of 
a liberal market economy (LME) with a voluntarist skills formation regime – relies heavily on 
general skills formation at universities with little attention paid to specific skills through the 
vocational education and training (VET) system (Ashton, Sung, and Turbin 2000; Hall and 
Soskice 2001). This comparative perspective aids the assessment of the scale and nature of 
change observed in Korea, and supports the argument that Korea has not only departed 
from its developmental trajectory (characterised by a high degree of coordination) but also 
increasingly displays features of LMEs. This shift towards a liberal education and skills for-
mation regime has been facilitated by business defecting from the developmental alliance, 
as well as liberal employment and social protection to which parents responded with exces-
sive investments into education. Thus, rather than adopting an unspecified post-
developmental perspective, we suggest the use of established tools in comparative political 
economy – not only to improve our understanding of education and skills in Korea, but also 
for better integrating East Asian political economies in the comparative literature of ad-
vanced political economies. Our analysis of the Korean case also calls for a greater promi-
nence of education policies in the dominant institutionalist political economy literature with 
its limited focus on skills formation in the workplace.  
The paper is structured as follows: We first review Korea’s historical developmental 
education and skills formation regime and the associated ‘economic miracle’. The paper 
then assesses the initial expansion of higher education in the 1980s and the crumbling of 
the developmental regime. In the analysis of education and skills after democratisation, we 
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first look at employers withdrawing from the old regime, and then parents and the outbreak 
of ‘education fever’ breaking the developmental education and skills formation regime. 
 
Developmental Skills Formation, Late Industrialisation and the Korean “Economic Miracle” 
When Korea gained independence from Japan in 1945, its economy was dominated by agri-
culture, and the country was not only utterly poor and under-developed but also lacked any 
meaningful educational infrastructure. During colonialism, the Japanese rulers heavily re-
stricted access to education and even banned the use of the Korean language. To fight 
widespread illiteracy, the Rhee Syngman government (1948-1960) of liberated (and at first 
democratic) Korea initiated a massive and rapid expansion of primary education. Though 
interrupted by the Korean War (which brought nationwide devastation and impoverished 
the Korean people even further), educational progress was remarkable, and the country saw 
the illiteracy rate of the over-12 year-olds drop from 78% in 1945 to 27.9% by 1960. At the 
early stage of industrialisation, this expansion of basic education provided the economy 
with an abundance of unskilled but literate workers to build up light, labour-intensive manu-
facturing that allowed breaking into world markets with low-cost labour (Ashton et al. 2002; 
Ihm 1999). 
Based on a strong belief that education presents as an important means of social 
mobility and social status (and is not only an end in itself as Confucianism would suggest; cf. 
Seth 2002), the rapid expansion of primary education stoked up considerable social demand 
for secondary education, quickly accelerating in the 1960s. In an educational context with 
firmly established and widely accepted ranking systems among secondary schools and ter-
tiary institutions, parents in pursuit of their children’s admissions to desired schools and col-
leges mobilised considerable financial resources for private tutoring to complement public 
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education. So-called ‘shadow education’ developed unseen dimensions in Korean society, 
especially with affluent middle classes using their financial power to fuel increasing educa-
tional competition. In 1967, it was estimated that about 9 in 10 six-graders in Seoul received 
private tutoring, for instance. To address this development which turned into a social con-
cern receiving considerable public attention, the Park Chung-Hee government, which forced 
itself into power in a military coup d’état in 1961, introduced a Middle School Equalisation 
Policy in 1968, which replaced a school entrance examination system with a lottery system 
within school districts. This was followed by a similar policy for high schools. Also, in addi-
tion to turning private schools into de-facto state schools in terms of finance and govern-
ance structures, ‘elite’ schools in the eyes of the public were converted into general schools 
as another measure to crack down the deeply engrained hierarchy among Korean schools. 
Unsurprisingly, this authoritarian policy met considerable opposition from well-off families, 
private and elite school organisations and some education experts who feared falling school 
standards, but the authoritarian Park Chung-Hee government remained unimpressed. In the 
wider population, a sense developed that private education and competition reached unac-
ceptable dimensions, and for this reason the government’s draconian action is thought to 
have boosted the legitimacy of the regime. Importantly, this equalisation policy also needs 
to be seen in the broader political economic context of early Korean industrialisation, which 
needed a large and steady supply of workers with basic to moderate skills to satisfy the de-
mand from a rapidly expanding manufacturing sector. In this situation, the ambitions of the 
middle classes (also reflected in a rising number of students repeating the sixth grade to 
prepare for middle school entrance exams) was considered misplaced and perceived as 
hampering economic development (Park 2010). 
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The economic success of the developmental strategy of the 1960s created labour 
shortages and corresponding pressure on wages, which in turn made light-industry-based 
development increasingly unfeasible. In this context, leaving the basic skills route of indus-
trial development became a political priority and a deliberate change of strategy towards 
higher value-added manufacturing was undertaken. The Park Chung-Hee government start-
ed to pursue an ambitious Heavy and Chemical Industrialisation Plan in the early 1970s, and 
the developmental state considered skills policy as an intimate element of its new industrial-
isation strategy. It was understood that the supply of mainly semi-skilled labour to the 
emerging industries was imperative for the government’s economic project, and thus re-
quired significant efforts in human capital investments for greater productivity and labour 
force stability. This provided the socio-economic underpinnings for increased expenditure 
on education and training but also on health and enterprise welfare (Ihm 1999; Deyo 1992).  
In this context, building on the progress in primary education, the Park Chung-Hee 
government increased its investment in secondary education with a strong vocational orien-
tation, to produce the craftsmen needed for the desired heavy and chemical industrialisa-
tion. Throughout the 1970s, we observe an expansion of vocational high schools, and the 
government was keen to increase the number of students in these schools. Whilst the gov-
ernment was not able to ‘force’ students into vocational education, the very strict control of 
enrolment quotas for each public and private university at the departmental level – not 
meeting public demand – severely limited access to higher education; and this effectively 
directed young people onto the vocational track (Ihm 1999; Kim and Lee 2006; Morris 1996). 
The prioritisation of vocational high schools, however, was not without controversy 
either. Employers felt that vocational high schools could not keep up with changes in the 
workplace and provided them with outdated skills. Unsurprisingly, many parents also felt 
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uneasy about pushing their children onto the vocational track. Parents continued to have a 
strong preference for general high schools (humanities track) that were geared towards uni-
versities; and vocational high schools and vocational two-year colleges, which were promot-
ed by the authoritarian government, were regarded as being of low social status. Applicants 
to vocational colleges were typically those who failed to enter four-year universities (Ihm 
1999). This strong preference for academic education and little appreciation for the voca-
tional track compares well to the situation in Britain, which also displays a rather rigid edu-
cational hierarchy, ascribes great importance to rankings and is well known for its elite insti-
tutions in education. Thus, with its ‘working-class heritage’, VET in Britain, likewise, suffers 
from a very poor image and is typically left to underachieving youngster who fail to enter 
university (Fisher and Simmons 2012).  
A key element of the Korean industrial strategy was the nurturing of national cham-
pions to promote economic development. Providing low-interest credits and industrial sub-
sidies among others, the developmental state facilitated the building of business conglom-
erates, which became to dominate the Korean economy (Amsden 1989; Johnson 1987). Crit-
ically, this economic structure with the presence of large workplaces allowed the establish-
ment of enterprise-based skills formation. In 1974, in the face of the insufficiency of VET 
schools and anticipated skills shortages in the government’s science and technical manpow-
er forecast, new legislation required large employers (first the ones with more than 500 
employees, and later the ones with more than 300) to train a certain share of their workers, 
and non-compliant businesses were fined. Although the government did not directly ‘force’ 
employers to intensify their investments in vocational skills, the training levy resulted in a 
significant rise in training activities – from 48,000 craftsmen between 1967 and 1971 to 
about 177,000 in the following five-year period, and numbers peaked at almost 340,000 be-
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tween 1977 and 1981 (Green et al. 1999; Park 2012). SMEs lacked the capacity for work-
place-based skills formation, but they benefited from some ‘excess’ skilled labour that the 
training levy produced in large workplaces. Yet, SMEs continued to rely, to a considerable 
extent, on state-provided VET, contributing to the increasing skills schism between chaebols 
and SMEs (Ashton et al. 2002). Nonetheless, until the mid-1980s, wage differentials by firm 
size were “almost non-existent” (Korea Labor Institute 2009: 80); and, indeed, we observe a 
decline in social inequality from the 1970s (Cheon 2014), supporting the argument of egali-
tarianism during the authoritarian regime (Park 2010).  
In this critical episode of Korean late industrialisation and rapid economic growth, as 
well established in the developmental state literature (Amsden 1989; Wade 1990), we find a 
strong state, with the infamous Economic Planning Board and its five-year economic devel-
opment plans at the heart of policy-making, that pursued a manpower planning policy, in 
which vocational high schools and workplace training delivered the specific skills needed for 
industrialisation. Also, the extraordinary centralisation in the developmental state made 
possible an effective coordination between industrial and education policies (Ashton et al. 
2002; Park 2012). State-led coordination, thus, allowed to overcome market failure (espe-
cially, the problem of free-riding) that is commonly associated with specific skills formation 
(cf. Crouch 2006 on skills formation systems). However, besides ensuring compliance of 
business, government also needed to suppress the public demand for academic education 
(namely, discouraging general high schools and limiting the access to higher education) to 
provide the economy with vocational skills. Hence, with regard to both business and society, 
the developmental state displayed strong interventionist regulation; and it was ultimately 
the massive imbalance of power between the authoritarian government, on one side, and 
business and society, on the other side, that allowed the state to dominate the production 
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regime and enforce its vision of industrialisation, which admittedly produced some remark-
able economic results. This and the seemingly stable reproduction of the developmental in-
stitutional arrangement could, prima facie, be read in terms of the notion of complementa-
rity of an equilibrium-functionalist approach. Though, the success of the developmental 
strategy was also critical for the political legitimation of the authoritarian rule of President 
Park Chung-Hee (cf. Kwon 1999), to which also strict employment protection enforced by 
the state in core sectors of the economy contributed in the absence of comprehensive social 
protection (Deyo 1992; Song 2014). 
Korea in this critical episode of industrialisation is well described as a CME as the au-
thoritarian state displayed extraordinary ‘coordinating’ capacity, but it presents an institu-
tional reproduction that is rather different from Germany’s traditional corporatism, where 
employers and trade unions are intimately involved in coordination, including the skills for-
mation system (Bosch and Charest 2008; Hall and Soskice 2001). Instead, coordination in 
Korea’s political economy rested upon a strong state that was able to impose its policies in 
the absence of democracy (which makes Korea also different from its Japanese neighbour; 
cf. Pempel 1998 and Rosenbluth and Thies 2010 on Japan’s political economy). In the au-
thoritarian state of Korea, trade unions were repressed to ensure low-cost and disciplined 
labour and to prevent the rise of the political left, as open dissent from employers was not 
tolerated by the Park Chung-Hee government either (Deyo 1987; Jones and Sakong 1980).  
 
The Expansion of Higher Education and the Crumbling of Developmental Skills Formation  
After initial success, the training levy struggled to deliver, and we observe a decline in work-
place learning from 340,000 to 115,000 between 1982 and 1986. An increasing number of 
companies, still arguing that the training system was too rigid to respond to the changing 
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skills demands of the Korean economy, preferred to pay fines rather than providing in-
house training. Apparently, the training levy failed to establish a skills formation system that 
was comparable to the aspired German vocational system, but instead produced relatively 
basic vocational skills (mainly at the semi-skilled level) (Ashton et al. 2002; Park 2010). 
Hence, the developmental skill formation regime displays some first cracks. Business had 
become increasingly unwilling to comply with the government’s expectations; and employ-
ers’ rising economic power, to a great extent a result of the government’s successful indus-
trialisation strategy, allowed business to display some limited dissent (Hundt 2009; Kim 
2003). The persistent employer reluctance to engage positively with vocational training in 
the workplace suggest that the enforced skills formation regime of the 1970s did not devel-
op into a stable equilibrium. Employers failed to develop genuine interest in upskilling their 
workforce. This is rather different to the German experience where employers developed a 
genuine commitment to vocational skills formation, which facilitated remarkable productivi-
ty improvements and Germany’s system of diversified quality production (Streeck 1992). 
Additional (political) pressure on education and skills formation can be observed in 
the aftermath of the assassination of President Park Chung-Hee in 1979 by the director of 
Korea’s central intelligence agency. This assassination created a power vacuum in the mili-
tary regime, which was used by General Chun Doo-Hwan to seize power in a coup d'état. 
Not only was the new government confronted with increasingly non-compliant employers, 
but also with growing public dissatisfaction; and accordingly it needed to increase its politi-
cal legitimacy. For the urban middle classes, education remained a major social concern, and 
the remarkable expansion of secondary education in the 1970s fuelled further the demand 
for higher education. Confronted with considerable political pressure and social unrest 
across the country (including a democratic uprising that was crushed as exemplified in the 
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Gwangju massacre), the new Chun Doo-Hwan government eased entry into higher educa-
tion by increasing admission by 30% (as compared to original 1981 admissions quota) and by 
50% in the following year. The new policy, however, also prescribed that the number of 
graduates should not exceed the number of the previous admissions quota in order to in-
crease competition amongst students – also to divert them from widespread political activ-
ism. This new ‘graduation quota’ proved incredibly unpopular – not only with parents and 
students who feared failing their degrees after making considerable time and financial in-
vestments, but also with universities. The government, lacking the power of the previous 
Park Chung-Hee administration, could not ignore the public pressure; and it decided not to 
implement the graduation quota, showing the limits of government control in the 1980s de-
spite continued authoritarian rule. As a consequence, student number almost tripled be-
tween 1979 (the year of Park assassination) and 1986 (the year before the beginning of Ko-
rean democratisation) (Kim 2008). 
 Whilst relaxing the regulatory stance on higher education, the Chun Doo-Hwan gov-
ernment implemented an outright ban of private tutoring in 1981, in response to its souring 
demand in the face of highly competitive university entrance exams. Middle classes contin-
ued to make excessive use of private tutoring with an increasing effect on lower classes, 
which were not actually in a financial position to enter the costly ‘race’ for university educa-
tion. For a growing number of families, private tutoring presented an immense financial 
burden; and the ban, for this reason, received some considerable public support, as the 
equalisation policy during the Park Chung-Hee government (Park 2010). 
 The development in the 1980s mark the beginning of “massification” of Korean high-
er education (Kim 2008: 233). Yet, despite allowing a considerable growth in student num-
bers, it is important to note that the state continued to perform the role of a critical regula-
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tor. Not only continued the government to regulate student numbers, but also, importantly, 
it banned private education to improve resource allocation in education. Further to this, re-
gardless of employers’ discontent, the training levy remained in place. Political legitimatisa-
tion was certainly an important reason for the Chun Doo-Hwan government to better ac-
commodate parental preferences for academic education. But these developments starting 
in the early 1980s also need to be seen as the government’s attempt to facilitate higher 
skills in order to promote knowledge-based high-technology industries for a more diversi-
fied economic structure (Green et al. 1999; Cheon 2014; Jessop 2016). Thus, on the one 
hand, we find a government that continued with significant intervention into the economy 
complying with the image of the developmental state; on the other hand, the authoritarian 
state displayed greater responsiveness to societal demands to legitimise its rule, which 
could be interpreted as a decline in ‘coordinating’ capacity – not only responding to parents 
but also ‘allowing’ large companies to reduce their training efforts. In other words, although 
the state certainly continued to dominate, we observe a shift in the balance of power -- no 
longer allowing the state to prescribe in the manner of the Park Chung-Hee government. 
Critically, in terms of the education and skills formation regime, the change in education and 
skills policy initiated the move towards LMEs with their focus on more general skills, as op-
posed to specific (vocational) skills which dominate CMEs like Germany, but also its ‘devel-
opmental’ variant as exemplified in the Korean case.   
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Democratisation, Economic Liberalisation and the End of Developmental Skills Formation  
The departure from developmental skills formation and move toward general skills for-
mation continued after the country’s transition to democracy at the end of the 1980s. At 
first, though, the government of the newly elected President Roh Tae-Woo (with one foot 
still in the past, as he was ‘hand-picked’ by the previous military regime and successful only, 
since opposition forces could not agree on a united candidate) tried to ‘reinvent’ the devel-
opmental skills formation system. It extended the training levy to smaller companies (as 
small as with 150 employees) as well as increasing the levy; and the government wanted to 
increase the share of young people in vocational high schools from about one third to 50%. 
This, however, did not translate into greater training engagement, or more students on the 
vocational high school track (Green et al. 1999; Ihm 1999). Also, the government’s experi-
menting with vocational training that was thought to emulate the German dual system 
failed to deliver. Employers continued to display little interest in upskilling their workforce 
but rather stuck with their established low-price product strategies (Green et al. 1999; Jeong 
1995).   
The failed copying of the German dual system resembles similar experiences in Brit-
ain, where the conservative Major government introduced the so-called ‘Modern Appren-
ticeship’ around the same time, in order to improve intermediate (vocational) skills with the 
ambition to boost productivity levels, which compared poorly to some of the UK’s major 
competitors, such as Germany, France and especially the US. As in Korea, British employers 
did not show much interest in this new apprenticeship system, which did not seem to corre-
spond well with dominant low-price product strategies (Fuller and Unwin 2003; Hogarth, 
Gambin, and Hasluck 2012). This suggests that ‘German-style’ vocational training is not 
compatible with low-price product strategies; and both Korea and Britain might be consid-
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ered as being caught in ‘low skills/low productivity’ equilibria (Finegold and Soskice 1988; 
Lauder 1999).  
With the second free election and the victory of the conservative opposition leader 
Kim Young-Sam (1993-98), however, rather comprehensive changes took place. The new 
government pursued some far-reaching so-called ‘liberalisation’ policies changing the face 
of the Korean political economy. Developmental skills formation continued to decline, and it 
eventually came to an end – as we observed, more generally, a slow ‘death’ of the devel-
opmental state. The all-powerful Economic Planning Board was abolished, and the financial 
sector was liberalised allowing firms’ entrance into the non-banking intermediaries sector as 
well as greater access to equity markets and foreign credit. At the same time, industrial sub-
sidies had been almost phased out, largely due to mounting budget deficits. Employers 
strongly pressed for neoliberal reform; and similar pressure for the liberalisation of the Ko-
rean economy came from the US, which became, after the end of the Cold War, increasingly 
intolerant towards their substantial trade deficit with Korea and the Korean government’s 
protection and control of its domestic market. American pressure to push back the govern-
ment’s strong grip on the economy thus strengthened the position of employers. Important-
ly, these liberalisation policies (especially, the deregulation of finance) made business (in 
particular, chaebols) less reliant on the state, allowing employers to exercise their voice 
more assertively in policy-making. With increasingly liberal business preferences, the old 
developmental alliance between the state and business disintegrated (Fleckenstein and Lee 
2017; Kong 2000). In the field of education and training (as in the wider political economy 
literature), we see the notion of ‘post’-developmentalism emerging (Park 2007; Park 2012). 
Critically, for developmental skills formation, the government – responding to in-
creasing pressure from employers – abolished the training levy and replaced the compulsory 
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workplace training system with a voluntary system where companies can receive some fi-
nancial support for vocational training through the newly established employment insur-
ance. The new system, however, failed to provide any strong incentives for meaningful (ini-
tial) vocational skills formation in the workplace but rather facilitated short-term training 
courses  (Yoon and Lee 2009; Lee 2007). Employers not only show incredibly little interest in 
vocational training in their workplaces but also display little appreciation for vocational high 
schools and junior colleges. This leads the OECD to conclude very weak involvement of busi-
ness in VET policy. Acknowledging the challenge of little employer engagement, the gov-
ernment created sector councils for better communication with business, but this initiative 
failed to produce any meaningful engagement of employers (OECD 2009a). These develop-
ments also display great similarities with Britain. Earlier though in the 1980s, the Thatcher 
government pursued aggressive deregulation policies, including the abolition of Industrial 
Training Boards, which had the authority to introduce training levies. These changes moved 
Britain very quickly onto a fairly liberal skills formation regime (King 1997). Dealing with the 
long track record of low employer interest in vocational skills, Britain also introduced Sector 
Skills Councils, but these, as in Korea, failed to deliver greater employer engagement (Keep, 
Lloyd, and Payne 2010). 
The abolishment of the training levy system and the accelerated decline in work-
place training had huge implications for skills supply. As discussed earlier, in the develop-
mental skills formation systems, large employers trained beyond their demand, and thereby 
provided ‘excess’ skilled labour to SMEs. With sharply reduced training efforts, large em-
ployers not only reduced the pool of skilled labour for SMEs, but also started recruiting ex-
perienced workers from SMEs (especially, from those in their supply chain). This causes ma-
jor problems for SMEs. These, typically under enormous cost pressure from chaebols, not 
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only lack the capacity (in terms of resources and time) to engage in vocational training (or 
train young graduates from university), but also are faced with an ever greater danger of 
their skilled and experienced workers being poached by larger companies, with which they 
cannot compete in terms of pay and benefit packages. Thus, whilst SMEs increasingly rely on 
the recruitment of experienced workers to meet skills need, it has become ever more diffi-
cult to attract and retain these in the face of chaebols’ growing interest in experienced 
workers as well (Jeong 1995; Park 2007). In this context, it does not come as a great surprise 
that the SME sector has been suffering from skills shortages and that the productivity gap 
between large companies and SMEs have been growing (OECD 2015). 
As part of the government’s liberalisation agenda, we also saw significant changes in 
higher education policy. With the rise of the so-called knowledge-based economy and grow-
ing global competition, the traditional Korean education system, emphasising uniformity 
and standardisation, was increasingly seen as inadequate to nurture creative workforces 
with diversified skills required in the new economic environment, in particular with the 
great importance ascribed to high-technology industries for future economic success. Coin-
ciding with the ever greater prominence of neoliberal thinking within the bureaucracy, the 
Kim Young-Sam government became increasingly susceptible to market-based, supply-
oriented solutions for innovation in education and skills policy that were thought to better 
address the needs of Korea’s modernising economy (Ablemann, Choi, and Park 2012; Park 
and Kim 2014; Park 2013).  The very influential Presidential Commission for Education Re-
form (1994-96) explicitly called for a shift in the government role from “controlling and 
regulating” to “encouraging and supporting” (Presidential Commission on Education Reform 
1996: 83). Also, in its deliberations, the commission, diagnosing the ineffectiveness of the 
existing education and training system, explicitly rejected the objective of further vocation-
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alisation and abandoned the Roh Tae-Woo government’s ambition of increasing enrolment 
target for vocational high schools; and instead deregulation of the higher education sector 
was suggested for the expansion of student numbers (Ihm 1999). Following the recommen-
dations of the commission, higher education experienced changes of an unseen scale during 
the Kim Young-Sam government to lift the country’s skill levels. The deregulation of the 
strict admission system (with the exception of Seoul in order to prevent further migration to 
the metropolitan area, and the exception of some subjects, e.g. medicine and teaching) re-
sulted in a massive increase in student numbers. In addition, the government deregulated 
the establishment of new universities, which resulted in a number of new institutions in-
cluding ‘satellite campuses’ of Seoul-based universities (Kim and Lee 2006). Abandoning the 
interventionist strategy of the developmental state and putting faith into a market-based 
approach (Kim and Lee 2006; Park 2012), these reforms by the Kim Young-Sam government 
mark a critical shift away from specific skills formation in vocational high schools and work-
places (as promoted by the developmental state) to a system that more strongly focuses on 
general skills through the higher education system to promote knowledge-intensive and 
high-technology industries, especially in the information technology sector (Cheon 2014).  
This shift in industrial strategy also needs to be seen in the context of considerable 
wage increases after democratisation. Often employing militant strategies, trade unions, 
especially in large workplaces, flexed their organisational muscles and achieved remarkable 
improvements in pay and corporate welfare (typically in excess of improvements in produc-
tivity). This undermined the competitiveness of Korean industry – “stuck between cheap-
labour China and high-tech Japan” (Kim 2010: 314). These developments led policy-makers 
to the conclusion that the country needed to proceed from an industrial to the above men-
tioned knowledge-based society in order to stay internationally competitive. In this context, 
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the government, with ever greater trust in market mechanisms, stepped back in order to 
allow chaebols’ entering of high-tech industries; and business conglomerates then took the 
‘driving seat’ (Lauder 1999; Park 2012). 
Also, employers, feeling the pressure from rising labour costs, started pushing for la-
bour market deregulation. In the labour market regime of the developmental state, the 
government effectively enforced a no-lay-off policy in large workplaces, in addition to pre-
scribing considerable corporate welfare measures. This system of job protection (i.e. de-
facto lifetime employment for core workforces) and corporate social welfare allowed resid-
ual social policy without much unrest during the period of fast industrialisation. Whilst im-
posing here some considerable costs on employers, the authoritarian state, repressing or-
ganised labour, also enforced wage constraint in order not to jeopardise the competitive-
ness of Korean industry in world markets (Deyo 1987). Democratisation and globalisation 
successively undermined this compromise between the state and employers. Business con-
sidered labour market deregulation for both insiders and outsiders imperative -- the former 
to allow corporate restructuring, and the latter for a greater use of irregular workers to re-
duce labour costs. The first initiatives for labour market deregulation by the Kim Young-Sam 
government resulted in a reform gridlock with opposing trade unions, but the following cen-
tre-left government of Kim Dae-Jung, under the pressure of the East Asian financial crisis, 
implemented the failed labour market deregulation of its predecessor, which translated into 
a considerable increase in irregular employment (approximately 35% of all wage-earners 
according to conservative estimates) – thus amplifying existing dualism in the Korean labour 
market (Fleckenstein and Lee 2017; Lee 2011). Irregular workers not only receive lower 
wages, but also face much greater employment insecurity and less social protection (despite 
some important improvements in social security for outsiders during the Kim Dae-Jung gov-
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ernment). The greater use of irregular workers allowed employers reducing more costly in-
ternal labour markets. Having said that, labour market insiders also typically had to endure 
deteriorating pay and working conditions in exchange for job security (Song 2014). These 
dramatic developments since the late 1990s have translated into rising poverty rates and 
income inequality, undermining Korea’s previous relatively egalitarian social structure (Chi 
and Kwon 2012; Park 2010).  
The rapid disintegration of the developmental skills formation regime after democra-
tisation suggests that the previous model relied on enforcement by a strong state rather 
than genuine support from employers – their reluctance to engage in workplace training in 
the 1980s turned into political pressure for deregulation. Put differently, democratisation 
resulted in a massive shift in the power balance between the state and business, with 
chaebols exercising their voice most strongly. The dismantling of developmental skills for-
mation and the expansion of higher education were part of wider changes in the Korean po-
litical economy, including the deregulation of labour markets with enormous implications 
for Korea’s social fabric. With democratisation and losing control over ever larger chaebols, 
the state saw its steering capacity decline. Developmental skills formation, as the develop-
mental state more generally, have become both economically and politically unfeasible. In-
stead, Korea moved firmly towards an LME education and skills formation regime, facilitated 
by more liberal labour market regulation and increasing inequality associated with this. Par-
adoxically, these developments have partly been the consequence of the state’s industrial 
strategy, namely the creation of national champions that could compete in global markets. 
In other words, the (developmental) state created colossal chaebols dominating the econo-
my, and these conglomerates eventually became too powerful that was incredibly difficult 
to ignore their demands. Globalisation and cost pressures further contributed to the shifting 
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power balance between business and the state, as employers exploited their ‘exit option’ 
from producing in Korea. Unlike the episode of late industrialisation, chaebols gained the 
upper hand. However, developmental skills formation not only experienced huge pressure 
from business but also from parents with their persistent strong desire for academic educa-
tion.  
 
Democratisation, Parents and the Outbreak of ‘Education Fever’ 
Whilst authoritarian governments were reasonably successful suppressing academic educa-
tion, this was no longer possible in democratic Korea with parents aggressively pressing for 
the educational credentials of their children. With democratization came the greater appe-
tite for more individualistic education, and this further fuelled the transformation of the ed-
ucation system in Korea – driven again by the middles classes, which ultimately thought to 
use their financial strength to gain advantage for their off-spring (Ablemann, Choi, and Park 
2012; Lo et al. 2015). After democratisation, private education expenditure increased con-
siderably – for higher education but also ‘shadow education’ in so-called hagwons (private 
tutoring institutions) complementing public schooling. Whilst Japan is widely considered the 
pioneer in private tutoring, where students, typically in jukus, receive intensive supplemen-
tary education (particularly during school vacations), Korea not only followed the trajectory 
of its neighbour but shows an even greater extent of private after-school education. House-
hold expenditure for private tutoring has successively increased since democratisation in 
the late 1980s and has become equivalent to about 80% of public expenditure on primary 
and secondary education. The nearly 100,000 hagwons in Korea employ more teachers than 
the public education sector and have become the largest employer of graduates in humani-
ties and social sciences. In 2015, private education spending per child hit a record high, with 
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7 out of 10 children receiving private tutoring and with elementary school children being 
most reliant on it. Also, not coming with much surprise, we find high-income parents (the 
top quintile) spending about 8 times as much money on their offspring than the poorest 
families (the bottom quintile). To access good-quality tutoring, private education is a major 
force driving domestic migration, contributing to the uneven development between Seoul 
and the rest of the country. It also facilitated migration within Seoul to areas with a high 
density of hagwons. Notably, we find a concentration of about 6,000 hagwons in wealthy 
Seoul borough of Gangnam, where the strong presence of private institutes is considered a 
key reason for rising property prices (Asian Development Bank 2012; Jones 2012; Statistics 
Korea 2016, 2015; Kim 2010). In light of these observations, it seems fair to conclude the 
outbreak of “education fever” (Seth 2002) in democratic Korea. 
Challenging Confucian explanations, survey data tell us that excessive private spend-
ing for tutoring is, first and foremost, driven by the desire to enter prestigious universities 
for good job prospects. In Korea, it is a widely held belief that the status of the university 
attended translates, more or less directly, into labour market success. The prestige of uni-
versity is therefore considered to largely determine later life chances. Unsurprisingly, as 
with Britain, Korea has a widely accepted university ranking system, structuring university 
preferences and reinforcing these. Data also show that having fewer children raises parental 
expectations; and that parents, though to a lesser extent, are concerned about the quality 
of public schools. Parents also report a perception that their children would experience a 
disadvantage if they did not attend hagwons (Jones 2013). Private tutoring has, obviously, 
become a social norm, and dominates the lives of young learners. 
The assumption that the prestige of the university one attends greatly determines 
one’s later life chances is confirmed when looking post-graduation labour market success. 
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There is considerable evidence that ‘elite’ universities indeed pay off in the labour market 
(Kim and Lee 2006), and unsurprisingly two-year junior colleges do not offer great income 
prospects compared to four-year universities. But we also observe a significant difference 
between four-year universities located in Seoul and regional universities, and it is notewor-
thy that the university is more important for labour market success than the academic disci-
pline (with the exception of a few obvious subjects, such as medicine and business admin-
istration). In short, Korea presents a highly stratified higher education system (Park 2015).  
Korean policy-makers show increasing awareness of the excessive nature of private 
tutoring, but only limited measures to contain it were taken (notably, a ‘hagwon curfew’ at 
10pm, the prohibition of school teachers creating questions for hagwons, and public after-
school programmes) (Jones 2013; Kim and Lee 2006). However, it also needs to be noted 
that government has further fuelled the explosion of shadow education when the Kim 
Young-Sam administration (1993-98) increased the number of so-called ‘special purpose 
high schools’ (especially, those with foreign languages specialism), which turned into de-
facto elite high schools, effectively demanding private tutoring to access these highly selec-
tive schools. More recently, the conservative Lee Myung-Bak government (2008-13) fol-
lowed in the steps of Kim Young-Sam with a high school diversification programme, which 
aimed at creating 300 new specialised high schools for greater hierarchy and competition in 
the schools system (Park 2010). As an alternative to entering the ‘race’ for these highly se-
lective schools, an increasing number of parents even opts for a more ‘extreme’ educational 
strategy – that is sending their offspring overseas for school education at an early age, 
which is thought to facilitate children’s English language development in particular (Lo et al. 
2015). 
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The great desire for academic education has translated into extraordinary enrolment 
rates in higher education. In fact, nowhere else in the OECD, we see more young people en-
tering tertiary education (OECD 2009b). Education expansion provided the growing Korean 
economy with highly qualified workers, but the boom of higher education came at the ex-
pense of intermediate skills; and we observe ‘over-education’ causing a severe skills mis-
match, in addition to low ‘education premiums’ for tertiary education by international 
standards (Park 2011). Thus, whilst there is considerable evidence that the attendance of 
certain universities pays off, the overall increase in the number of university graduates out-
paced labour market demand, leaving many young people with poor prospects in the labour 
market (Cheon 2014). In particular, the supply of graduates outstrips the chaebol demand 
for graduates – not only because of the massive increase in higher education but also be-
cause of shrinking internal labour markets in chaebols, which increasingly make use of irreg-
ular workers to reduce labour costs as discussed above. Put differently, the strong prefer-
ence for employment in large companies and the antipathy for SMEs meets a reality of an 
increasingly limited capacity of the former to absorb university graduates (Park 2007).  
Large companies cope well with this education and training system and in fact find 
themselves in the comfortable position to ‘cherry-pick’ the best graduates. SMEs, by con-
trast, struggle with education and training that is thought to prepare for employment in 
chaebols. This “distorting influence” (Lauder 1999: 286) of business conglomerates in the 
Korean labour market undermines SMEs, which increasingly fail to satisfy their (vocational) 
skills needs and, accordingly, display poor labour productivity, as discussed in the previous 
section. We observe a widening training and productivity gap between large companies and 
SMEs with their large share of irregular workers (Cheon 2014). The considerable private in-
vestment in education therefore effectively amplifies skills shortages and the productivity 
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problems in SMEs, as private investment in the Korean ‘winner-takes-all’ labour market is 
geared towards employment in chaebols – with parents pressing for educational credentials 
of their offspring so that they can enter chaebol employment. At the same time, VET is ne-
glected, locking SMEs in a low skills/low productivity equilibrium. Put differently, Koreans 
mobilise extraordinary private resources for the education of their children, but these re-
sources are not allocated most efficiently from a macro-economic point of view. 
However, Koreans’ great concern about prospects in the labour market is easy to 
grasp when looking at the growing dualism in the Korean labour market. Despite less gener-
ous conditions than in the past, the best wages and welfare, as well as the greatest job secu-
rity, are still achieved with large employers (especially, chaebols), whereas the employment 
conditions in SMEs saw much deterioration. Critically, we observe a massive increase of 
wage inequality, with SMEs’ relative wage to that of large employers dropping from about 
90% in 1980 to about 60% in the 2000s; Korea Labor Institute 2009). Unsurprisingly, when 
asked about their reluctances to work in SMEs, a Korean survey reveals that two thirds of 
respondents mention poor salaries, closely followed by lower job security and then poorer 
benefit packages (Kim, Kim, and Yun 2012). Also, international survey data tells us that Ko-
reans are greatly concerned about job security compared to their counterparts in most 
OECD countries. Only 40% of Koreans consider their jobs secure, which presents a consider-
able gap in comparison to the ‘hire-and-fire’ labour market of the US and the UK, for in-
stance (with 71% and 68%, respectively). In Japan, whose labour market is often considered 
rather similar to the Korean one, 61% of employees consider their jobs safe – a more than 
20 percentage point gap to Korea (ISSP Research Group 2013). In addition to polarisation 
between employment between large and small workplaces, we observe a (partly overlap-
ping) core/periphery distinction in terms of regular and irregular employment. Not only 
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have irregular workers a rather short average job tenure of 30 months (compared to 85 
months for regular workers), they also paid 36% less than labour market insiders and expe-
rience significant gaps in social protection. Accordingly, the intensifying labour market dual-
ism in Korea is widely considered the main driver for the rise in social inequality; and em-
ployment status is also closely linked to poverty among the working-age population. Given 
that irregular employment is rarely a ‘stepping stone’ into regular jobs, it might not be sur-
prising that many young people, fearing the ‘scarring effect’ of irregular jobs, prefer non-
employment over these jobs. We find many young people delaying graduation or making 
efforts of human capital building outside formal education (for instance, overseas language 
courses). Strong employment preferences for large employers make Korea one of the very 
few countries where the NEET rate for university graduates is higher than the overall age 
group of 15-29 year-olds (24.8% as compared to 18.0%) (OECD 2016). 
In this context of strongly dualised labour markets and social protection (and the as-
sociated rise in social inequality), it might not surprise to observe ‘over-investment’ driven 
by the hope to avoid precarious employment, even though (from a macro point of view) 
much of this investment is inefficient. In other words, anxiety of students and parents in the 
face of rising social inequality, economic uncertainty and (job) insecurity (associated with 
globalisation and related changes in Korean society and economy) drives ever more risky 
private investments in education to succeed in Korea’s increasingly ‘winner-takes-all’ labour 
market, as the core of well-paid and well-protected labour market insiders has been shrink-
ing.  
 
Conclusions  
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Starting as early as in the 1990s and with accelerating speed since the second half of the 
1990s, Korea moved increasingly towards a liberal education and skills formation regime 
with the country’s great reliance on general skills formation at universities rather than spe-
cific skills formation in the workplace and vocational training schools, which had previously 
been a defining feature of the developmental regime. Also, as in the liberal political econo-
my of Britain, Korea displays signs of a ‘low skills/low productivity equilibrium’. By contrast, 
in recognition of the lack of intermediate (vocational) skills, the experimenting with Ger-
man-style dual training system failed, which also resembles an experience in Britain. Against 
this background, observed changes in Korea are best described as a path departure from the 
developmental trajectory towards an increasingly liberal education and skills formation re-
gime, rather than a transformation within the trajectory of coordinated market economies. 
Challenging equilibrium-functionalist approaches and related arguments portraying 
the East Asian financial crisis as a critical juncture, we have shown that these developments 
started prior to the financial crisis, though it certainly accelerated the rise of the liberal edu-
cation and skills formation regime. Instead of reducing the explanation to the exogenous 
shock of the financial crisis, we have argued that the very success of the developmental 
state undermined its education and skills formation regime, as the state’s industrial strategy 
created powerful chaebols, which ultimately challenged the developmental state. We thus 
find critical endogenous sources for institutional change with important implications for the 
power architecture of the Korean political economy. As early as the 1980s, it can be seen 
that employers had not developed genuine support for the skills policy of the authoritarian 
state. This is rather different from the German experience, where business became a strong 
supporter of vocational skills formation in workplaces. When the government’s authority 
started dwindling in the 1980s, business could afford not meeting the government’s work-
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place training targets, for instance; and democratisation at the end of the decade allowed 
an outright ‘defection’ from the developmental alliance with employers displaying policy 
preferences resembling their counterparts in LMEs rather than CMEs. Not only the transi-
tion to democracy but also economic liberalisation empowered business and undermined 
the state’s coordinating capacity.  
Whilst a weakened government in the 1980s, seeking political legitimisation in tur-
bulent times, displayed some though limited responsiveness to parents’ great desire for ac-
ademic education, after democratisation the state could no longer suppress society’s drive 
for ever more education as a means of social mobility or to defend achieved social status. 
Not only do we observe a massive increase in private education expenditure for tertiary ed-
ucation, but also the rise of shadow education at the level of primary and secondary educa-
tion, fuelled by dualisation and poor social protection in the country’s winner-takes-all la-
bour market. The deregulation of employment protection after the East Asian financial crisis 
and the associated rise in social inequality amplified the drive for education, showing the 
strong interconnection between educational strategies, on the one hand, and social policy 
and societal change, on the other hand. 
In both cases, the defection of business and parents, a shift in power undermined the 
state’s coordinating capacity. Thus, despite seemingly stable institutional reproduction, the 
education and skills formation regime of the developmental state presented a very fragile 
equilibrium that rested upon an uneven balance of power rather than institutional comple-
mentarity. Also, challenging equilibrium-functionalist models, these approaches fail to cap-
ture that the observed shift in power ultimately produced a pathological equilibrium of ‘ed-
ucation inflation’, skills mismatch and social polarisation. The study of education and skills in 
Korea therefore suggests that institutionalist political-economic analysis of change needs to 
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take power more seriously instead of largely relying on functionalist assumptions of institu-
tional complementarities; and related to this, the predominant literature needs to address 
how positive reinforcement (as in the case of the Korean economic and education ‘miracle’) 
turns into a pathological equilibrium, which is obviously at odds with equilibrium-
functionalist theory. Here, power-distributional approaches offer invaluable insights. For the 
study of education and skills, the examination of the Korean case illustrates the intimate re-
lationship between education and social policy as well as the labour market and social ine-
quality. This also calls for further research to be fed into the dominant institutionalist politi-
cal economy literature, where both education and social policy have received insufficient 
attention.  
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